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ABSTRACT
If the probability of default increases 
with the debt burden, the set of feasible 
rescheduling schemes of a sovereign 
debt to private creditors can be depicted 
by an inverted U-shaped curve in the 
annual repaym ent-repaym ent period 
plane. If both the creditor and the 
indebted sovereign are risk averse and 
maximise expected utility from debt 
rep ay m en ts  and u np aid  d eb t, 
respectively, the Pareto  efficien t 
rescheduling schemes might be located 
on the upward sloping side of the 
feasible rescheduling curve, displaying a 
positive relationship  betw een the 
renegotiated annual repayment and the 
renegotiated repayment period, rather 
than the conventional trade-off. (/EL 
F34)
Associate Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at the 
University of Wollongong and a Senior Lecturer in the Department of 
Economics at Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel.
I Introduction
The heavy burden of external debts on the developing 
countries has led to a heightened concern about these 
countries' ability and commitment to repay their liabilities. 
This concern is rooted in the fact that, unlike a private debt, a 
sovereign debt is not subjected to laws of bankruptcy or to an 
enforcement of a collateral. Thus, when the potential penalties 
on default are not substantial, a rise in a country's level of 
indebtedness reduces that country's inclination to service its 
external liabilities. It is possible, however, that the probability 
of unilateral repudiation is moderated by a country's concern 
about the adverse effect of a default on its trustworthy 
reputation and, subsequently, on its access to foreign loans 
(Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Kletzer, 1984; and Grossman and 
Van Huyck, 1988) and by a threat of direct sanctions (Bulow 
and Rogoff, 1989).
In view of the developing countries' high level of 
indebtedness, it has been argued by Krugman (1989) that a 
country's financial obligations act like a high marginal tax rate 
which deters governments from taking painful measures to 
improve a country's economic performance and discourages 
capital formation. Thus, when an indebted country is on the 
downward sloping side of the 'debt relief Laffer curve', both 
debtor and creditor can benefit from a debt-reduction. Kenen 
(1990) and Sachs (1990) have asserted that the external debt's 
overhang is a primary cause for economic slow-down for 
many of the developing countries and have recommended the 
establishment of an international institution for organising 
debt relief and debt-rescheduling negotiations between private 
creditors and indebted countries. In contrast, Bulow and Rogoff 
(1990) have argued that the external debt problem is a
symptom of poor economic management and growth, that the 
presence of official creditors in debt negotiations ossifies the 
bargaining position of private creditors, and that efficiency 
would be best served by having less official involvement.
The basic approach for solving the developing countries' 
debt problem has been rescheduling and concerted lending. 
Alternatively, market-based debt-reduction schemes, such as 
debt buy-backs, securitisation and debt-equity swaps, have been 
suggested. They have been expected to reduce both the 
exposure of banks and the external liabilities of countries 
without the need for a collective bargaining of new credit or 
debt forgiveness, which might be accompanied by a severe free­
rider problem. However, as has been shown by Krugman
(1989), these market-based debt-reduction schemes cannot 
serve as an alternative to the orthodox strategy of rescheduling 
and concerted lending.
Assuming that a country's inclination to repay its liabilities 
decreases with its debt burden, but that the costs of repudiation 
are substantial, and recognising that a short-term illiquidity 
does not necessarily lead to a long-term insolvency, this paper 
firstly analyses the set of debt-rescheduling schemes which are 
feasible for both the debtor and the creditor. Subsequently, the 
paper analyses the Pareto efficient rescheduling schemes for 
the creditor and the debtor under the assumption that they are 
risk averse and maximise expected utility from the sum of debt 
repayments and from the unpaid debt, respectively. The 
structure and the major findings of the paper are as follows.
Section II analyses the debt-repayment constraint and the set 
of the rescheduling schemes which are feasible for both the 
debtor and the creditor. It shows that this set can be depicted by 
an inverted U-shaped curve in the annual repaym ent- 
repayment period plane.
Section III describes the creditor's choice of a rescheduling
scheme from the set of the feasible schemes. It postulates that 
the creditor's choice of the annual debt-repayment and the 
debt-repayment period maximises the creditor's expected 
utility from the perceived sum of annual debt-repayments 
subject to the debt-repayment constraint, and provides a 
geometrical presentation of the creditor's rescheduling choice. 
It is argued that the creditor's indifference curves in the annual 
repayment-repayment period plane can be upward sloping and 
hence the creditor's optimal rescheduling scheme can be on 
the upward sloping side of the feasible rescheduling curve. 
That is, it is possible that the creditor prefers to bear a lower 
risk of default and hence requires the smallest amount of 
annual repayment between the two feasible ones associated 
with his preferred length of the repayment period.
Section IV analyses the properties of the creditor's most 
preferred rescheduling scheme. In particular, it highlights the 
effects of the international interest rate, the country's external 
liabilities and potential output and the creditor's market share 
on the creditor's choice of a rescheduling scheme.
Section V analyses the debtor's preferences about 
rescheduling schem es and indicates that the debtor's 
indifference curves are downward sloping in the plane 
spanned by the annual repayment and the repayment period 
and that the debtor prefers rescheduling schemes characterised 
by a shorter repayment period but not necessarily a smaller 
annual repayment due to an increase in the probability of 
admissible default as the annual repayment rises.
Section VI considers both the creditor's and the debtor's 
preferences about the feasible rescheduling schemes and 
demonstrates that it is possible that the Pareto efficient set of 
rescheduling schemes is located on the upward sloping side of 
the feasible rescheduling curve below (and including) the 
creditor's choice and hence revealing a positive relationship
between the length of the repayment period and the amount of 
the annual repayment rather than a trade-off.
Finally, section VII concludes the paper with a brief 
summary.
IL Debt-Repayment Constraint and the Feasible Rescheduling 
Curve
The following analysis considers a situation in which a 
country is liable to a single private creditor, or to a well- 
coordinated syndicate of private creditors. It is assumed that 
the country 's external liabilities cannot be serviced in 
accordance with the originally contracted terms, and that both 
the indebted country and its creditor have a sufficient 
incentive for rescheduling the country's liabilities (Do) over a 
T-year period in equal, in constant prices, annual repayments 
(M) of principal and interest. An underlying rationale for equal 
annual repayments can be a creditor's aversion and a debtor's 
aversion toward excessive oscillations in their business cycles 
that might stem from a variable annual repayment.
Dealing with a sovereign country and assuming that the 
debtor's asset holdings abroad are negligible, the creditor is 
aware of the fact that his control over the rescheduled 
repayment is fairly limited. Nevertheless, it is assumed that 
the probability of default (p) perceived by the creditor is smaller 
than one due to the substantial costs that can be inflicted 
directly by retaliatory sanctions, such as a ban on trade and 
credit, and indirectly through a loss of trustworthy reputation. 
It is assumed further that the perceived probability of default: 
1. increases with the burden of servicing the debt, which is 
measured by the ratio of the renegotiated  annual repayment 
(M) to the indebted country's level of gross national product 
(or export) in constant prices (Y); and 2. decreases with the
creditor's ability to retaliate by limiting the country access to 
the international credit market proportional to the creditor's 
market share (s). These assumptions are incorporated into the 
following linear expression:
p = a(M /Y) - Xs. (1)
Here, a  is a positive scalar indicating the marginal effect of 
the debt burden on the country's inclination to default. 
Following Berg and Sachs (1988), it can be argued that a  is 
affected by the indebted country's social, political and economic 
structure. Sim ilarly, X is a positive scalar indicating the 
deterrent effect of the creditor's power in the international 
credit market.
It is also assumed that the indebted country's investment is 
adversely affected by the annual debt repayments through a 
decline in the governmental budget for investment and 
through an (expected and actual) increase in tax rates which, in 
the presence of capital mobility, discourages capital formation 
and repatriation of flight capital (Helpman, 1989). Since the 
country 's GNP is directly related to investm ent, this 
assum ption im plies that the indebted country's GNP is 
adversely affected by the annual debt repayment as indicated, 
for convenience, by the following linear equation:
Y = Y -5 M , fe l (2)
where Y is the highest level of GNP attainable had the annual 
debt-repayments been nil, and 8 is a positive scalar indicating 
the potentially marginal and adverse effect of the renegotiated 
annual debt-repayment on the country's GNP. Equation 2
implies that the renegotiated debt-repayment cannot exceed 
Y/&
The substitution of equation 2 into equation 1 for Y implies 
that the probability of default perceived by the creditor is given 
ty
p = aM /  (Y-8M) - As. (3)
Since 0 <  p <  1 and increases with the renegotiated annual debt 
repayment, M should be restricted further to lie within the 
open interval (M min, M max)/ where p(M min) = 0 and 
p(M max) =  1- The substitution of these boundary conditions 
into equation 3 implies:
Mmin"(a+8X s)Y (4)
and
1+Xs
Mmax"(a + 5 (l+ A s ))Y (5)
Note further that M max <Y /&
The actual annual debt-repayment (Q) is perceived by the 
creditor to be distributed as follows:
Q =
r M T-aM/(Y-5M) + As 
0 aM/(Y-5M)-Xs.
(6)
The nature of the analysis will not be substantially changed by 
replacing the assumption of a complete default by a partial
default, i.e., an actual annual repayment of yM dollars (0<y<l) 
with probability p.
The analysis of the debt-repayment constraint is conducted 
under the sim plifying assum ption that a-priori the 
distribution of the actual annual debt-repayment is perceived 
by the creditor to be stable over the repayment period. That is, 
the parameters a, 8 and as well as the creditor's market share 
and the indebted country's potential output, remain the same 
over the T years of the repayment period. Alternatively, one 
may incorporate, for example, an anticipation of economic 
grow th, or econom ic slowdown, into the analysis by
multiplying (Y - 8M) by a shift factor g‘, where g is a positive 
scalar (equal to one plus the anticipated growth rate). In view 
of equation 4, the sum of the expected debt-repayments (SEDR) 
discounted by the international annual (real) interest rate (r), 
which is assumed to be constant, over the T-year period is 
given by:
T
SEDR = I  [l-oM /(Y-8M )+Xs]M /(l+r)t 
t=0
= [l-aM/(Y-8M)+Xs]M[p(l-pT)/(l-p)] (7)
where
P = l/ ( l+ r ) . (8)
Assuming that the debtor and the creditor have identical 
assessments of the probability of default (i.e., they both use 
equation 3 and assign identical values to its parameters a, 8, X, s
and Y) and that the creditor believes that a short-term, or
current, illiquidity does not necessarily lead to a long-term 
insolvency and prefers to tolerate the uncertainty about future 
repayments and to renegotiate debt-repayment's terms with an 
allowance for episodes of temporary illiquidity rather than 
retaliate, the rescheduling schemes (M, T) which are feasible 
for both the debtor and the creditor should obey the following 
debt-repayment constraint:
[1 - aM/(y-5M)+As]M[p(l-pT)/(i-p)] = Do (9)
This constraint can be equivalently rendered as
T =  {log{p-(l-p)Do/[l-oM/(Y-8M)+Xs]M}/logP} -1 . (10)
The set of all the feasible rescheduling schemes can be 
depicted by a curve in the M-T plane, which is referred 
hereafter as the feasib le rescheduling curve. By differentiating 
equation 10 with respect to M and by recalling the assumption 
that the probability of default rises with M, it can be shown 
that, unlike the case of a private debt where a collateral can be 
enforced, along the feasible rescheduling curve of a sovereign 
debt the period of repayment is not necessarily shortened by an 
increase in the annual repayment. In fact, it can be shown that 
up to a critical level of annual debt-repayment, the rise in the 
probability of default stemming from an increase in M is 
dominant and hence the creditor should be compensated by a 
longer repayment period. However, beyond that critical level, 
the mere burden of the annual debt-repayment dominates the 
probability of default and consequently the debtor has to be 
compensated by a shorter repayment-period. This relationship 
between the length of the repayment-period and the annual
repayment along the feasible rescheduling curve is described in 
greater detail by Proposition 1 and Figure 1.
PROPOSITION 1: Along the feasible rescheduling curve
dT , 
dM
> 0 fo r  M min < M < Y/6-<(> 
=  0 for M = Y/ 8 - <(>
<  0 for Y/ 5 - <j><M£Mmax
where
V ^ / 1 (1+
V  [(1+Xs
Xs)
(1 1 )
A )&hx] '
The proof of this proposition is provided in the Appendix.
(1 2 )
Figure 1. The Feasible Rescheduling Curve
Figure 1 illustrates the above-mentioned proposition by 
displaying the set of all the rescheduling schemes which are 
feasible for both the debtor and the creditor,
Q =  {(M,T)e [l-oM/(Y-8M)+As]M[p(l-pT)/(1.p)]=DD}/
as an inverted U-shaped curve in the plane spanned by M and 
T. Equation 9 indicates further that an increase in the debtor's 
initial liabilities and an increase in the international interest 
rate shift the feasible rescheduling curve upward, whereas an 
increase in the country's potential GNP level and an increase 
in the creditor's market share in the international credit 
market shift the curve downward by reducing the probability 
of default.
The above analysis of the feasible rescheduling curve has 
been conducted under the assumption that the debtor's state is 
common knowledge. This assumption can be justified by the 
expectations for a very high degree of caution to be practiced by 
creditors in dealing with an insolvent debtor. This high degree 
of caution should lead to an extensive acquisition of 
information related to the future performance of the indebted 
country. The costs of acquiring such inform ation are 
moderated by the economies of scale associated with the 
establishment of a syndicate of creditors and by the data and 
research reports publicised by international organisations such 
as The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. If 
information used in the formation of expectations about the 
probability of default is rather asymmetric in the sense that the 
creditor and debtor have different sources of information and 
hence assign different values to the parameters of equation 3 a,
6, s and Y , it is likely that the debtor would claim that the 
probability of default is lower than that perceived by the 
creditor, for any given amount of annual debt-repayment, in
order to obtain a shorter repayment period than that required 
by the creditor. (Cf. Kletzer, 1989.) That is, under the alternative 
assumption of asymmetric information about the probability 
of default, it is likely that the feasible rescheduling curve 
considered by the debtor lies below the feasible rescheduling 
curve considered by the creditor.
The following sections describe the creditor's and the 
debtor's choices of a rescheduling scheme from the feasible set.
IIL Creditor's Choice of a Feasible Rescheduling Scheme
It is postulated that the creditor's choice of an annual debt- 
repaym ent and a debt-repaym ent period is a feasible 
combination (M ,T ) which maximises his expected utility 
from the perceived sum of the actual debt-repayments subject 
to the debt-repayment constraint described in the previous 
section. By virtue of equation 6, the number of years in which 
the indebted country is expected to be liquid and make the 
rescheduled annual repayment is a random variable 0 <, X < T 
having a binomial distribution b(T, 1 - p). It is expected that in 
T - X of the years the indebted country would not be liquid and 
hence would not be able to make the rescheduled annual debt 
repayment. Consequently, the sum of debt-repayments (MX) 
received during the rescheduled period is perceived by the 
creditor as a random variable. For convenience, it is assumed 
that the creditor's level of satisfaction from the perceived sum 
of debt-repaym ents can be found from  the negative- 
exponential utility function:
uc (MX) = l-exp(-RcMX) (13)
where Rc is a positive scalar indicating the creditor's degree of 
absolute risk-aversion. (For a discussion of the properties and
generality of the negative-exponential utility function see 
Hammond, 1974.)
By taking the expectation of both sides of equation 13, the 
creditor's expected utility from the accum ulated debt- 
repayments can be expressed as
E[uc(MX)] = 1 -E[exp(-RCMX)]. (14)
Recalling that X has a binomial distribution, E[exp(-RCMX)] can 
be interpreted as the moment-generating function of the 
binomial distribution evaluated at -RCM. Therefore,
E[uc(MX)] = 1 - [p+(l-p)exp(-RcM)F (15) •
and the creditor's rescheduling problem can be regarded 
equivalently as choosing Mmin<M <M max and T as to m axim ise 
the right-hand side of equation 15 subject to the expected debt- 
repayment constraint 10 and the perceived probability of 
default displayed by equation 3. An outline of the 
m athem atical solution to this problem is given in the 
Appendix.
Due to the computational complexity of the problem, it is 
useful to consider the geometrical presentation of the creditor's 
preferences and rescheduling choice in the M-T plane. A 
creditor's indifference curve can be defined as the locus of all 
combinations of M and T which yield the same level of 
expected utility from the sum of debt repayments.
PROPOSITION 2: The creditor's indifference curves are 
upward sloping in the M-T plane for all
M >r^ ln
y + ( l-p )R
p'
The proof of this proposition is given in the Appendix.
Since the effect of an increase in the annual repayment on 
the probability of default is positive and increases with M (i.e., 
p '> 0  and p " > 0 ,  as in d ica ted  by equ ation  3, 
( l /R c)ln{[p'+(l-p)Rc ] /  p'} diminishes as M increases. Thus, the 
larger the value of M the greater the likelihood that the 
rescheduling schemes constituted by M are lying on upward 
sloping indifference curves. Recalling that p(M max) =  1/ the 
right-hand side of the inequality indicated in proposition 2 is 
equal to zero and hance the creditor's indifference curves are 
upward sloping in the vicinity of Mmax. Moreover, equation 3
indicates that the larger a  and 8 and the smaller Y, the smaller 
the value of (l-p )/p ' and, consequently, the larger the range of 
M for which the creditor's indifference curves are upward 
sloping. These arguments and the fact that p(M m,n) = 0 imply 
that proposition 2 can be extended as follows.
PROPOSITION 2': I f  M min £  ln [ l  + RC/p'(Mmin)1, the
creditor's indifference curves are upward sloping in the
M-T plane for all Mmin<M <M max- .
The analysis of the creditor's choice of a rescheduling 
scheme proceeds under the assumption that the intrinsic 
value of p' is considerably large so that the condition indicated
in proposition 2 ' is satisfied and, consequently, the creditor's 
indifference curves are upward sloping in the M-T plane for all 
Mmin<M <M max.
The differentiation of equation A.17 with respect to T 
implies that as long as the creditor's indifference curves are 
upward sloping
d2T
dMdT | E(uc ) = const. >
Thus, the longer the repayment period the steeper the 
indifference curve. This, in turn, implies that the creditor's 
indifference curves are convex in the M-T plane and that as 
one moves upward along a perpendicular line in the M-T 
plane the slope of the creditor's indifference curves increases.
By virtue of equation 15 and the fact that 0<p+(l-p )exp (- 
RCM)<1, the creditor's expected utility increases with T for any 
given level of M. In view of this property and that the 
creditor's indifference curves are upward sloping, the creditor's 
expected utility from the perceived sum of the actual debt- 
repayments declines with the annual debt-repayment for any 
given period of repayment. The underlying rationale is that a 
rise in the annual payment, ceteris paribus, increases the 
probability of default and, consequently, low ers the 
expectations for debt-repayment and also raises the costs of risk 
bearing.
Since the creditor's expected utility rises with T for any 
given value of M and the creditor's indifference curves are, 
under the aforementioned assumption, upward sloping and 
convex, there exists a unique and interior solution to the 
creditor's rescheduling problem — the creditor's optimal 
rescheduling scheme is the tangency point A=(M , T ) between 
the upward sloping side of the feasible rescheduling curve and
the highest possible indifference curve as depicted in Figure 2. 
Since this tangency point is located on the upward sloping 
segment of the feasible rescheduling curve, the creditor's 
choice of the annual repayment lies in the open interval
IMmin/(y/S-4>)]- That is, given the debt-repayment period T% 
the creditor prefers to bear a lower risk of default and rather 
selects M* than the higher feasible level of annual debt- 
repayment M i.
Figure 2. The Creditor's Choice of a Feasible Rescheduling Scheme
IV. Comparative Statics of the Creditor's Choice of a Feasible 
Rescheduling Scheme
The analysis of the properties of the creditor's choice of the 
debt rescheduling scheme described above is summarised by 
propositions 3-5. Each proposition is followed by a brief 
discussion that outlines the proof and the underlying 
rationale.
PROPOSITION 3: An increase in either the international credit 
market's interest rate or the debtor's in itial liabilities  
changes the creditor's choice o f the rescheduling scheme 
in favor o f a longer period o f repayment and a sm aller 
annual repayment.
An increase in either the international interest rate (r) or the 
debtor's initial liabilities (e.g., from concerted lending) shifts 
the feasible rescheduling curve upward. Recalling also that the 
slope of the creditor's indifference curves increases with T, the 
tangency point between the new feasible rescheduling curve 
and a higher indifference curve is above and to the left of the 
initial one. Note further that an increase in the debtor's initial 
liabilities m ight also affect the slope of the creditor's 
indifference curves by reducing the creditor's tangible wealth 
and consequently changing his attitude toward risk. However, 
the differentiation of equation A.17 with respect to Rc does not 
provide a clear indication of the direction of that change. If an 
increase in the creditor's degree of risk aversion moderates the 
slope of the indifference curves, it reduces, or even offsets, the 
decline in M imposed by the upward shift of the feasible 
rescheduling curve. Thus, if the creditor's degree of absolute
risk aversion rises with a reduction in his tangible wealth, the 
increase in the debtor's initial liabilities might also increase the 
annual debt repayment required by the debtor. In any other 
circumstances, the annual repayment required by the creditor 
decreases as the debtor's initial liabilities increase. This 
proposition also implies that a debt-reduction shortens the 
repayment period. However, a debt-reduction does not affect 
the creditor's tangible wealth and (subsequently) the creditor's 
degree of risk aversion and indifference curves. Thus, a debt- 
reduction raises the annual debt repayment required by the 
creditor.
PROPOSITION 4: An increase in the indebted country's 
potential output (Y)
i. shortens the repayment period, but may not necessarily 
increase the annual repaym ent, if the creditor's 
indifference curves are steepened; or
ii. increases the annual repayment, but may not necessarily 
shorten the repaym ent period, if the creditor's 
indifference curves are flattened.
An increase in the country's potential output reduces the 
probability of default perceived by the creditor and debtor for 
any given amount of annual debt-repayment and hence shifts 
the feasible rescheduling curve downward. By virtue of 
equation 3, the greater the marginal effect of the debt burden 
on the country's inclination to default (i.e., a ), the larger the 
downward shift of the feasible rescheduling curve for a given 
increase in the country's potential output. Moreover, equation 
A .17 indicates that an increase in the country's potential 
output may also change the slope of the creditor's indifference
curves since p, p ' and 0 are affected by Y. However, the
differentiation of equation A.17 with respect to Y indicates that 
the change in the slope of the creditor's indifference curves is
not clear a-priori. If the increase in Y steepens the creditor's 
indifference curves, the tangency point between the lower 
rescheduling curve and a steeper indifference curve should 
reveal a shorter repayment period but not necessarily a larger 
annual repayment. The steeper the (new) indifference curve 
and the larger the downward shift of the feasible rescheduling 
curve (i.e., the larger the a ), the smaller the likelihood of a
larger annual repayment. In contrast, if the increase in Y 
flattens the creditor's indifference curves, the (new) tangency 
point should reveal a larger annual repayment but not 
necessarily a shorter repayment period. The flatter the (new) 
indifference curve and the smaller the downward shift of the 
feasible rescheduling curve (i.e., the smaller the a), the smaller 
the likelihood of a shorter repayment period.
PROPOSITION 5: An increase in the creditor's market share
i. shortens the repayment period, but may not necessarily 
increase the annual repaym ent, if the cred itor's 
indifference curves are steepened; or
ii. increases the annual repayment, but may not necessarily 
shorten the repaym ent period, if the creditor's 
indifference curves are flattened.
Private creditors can substantially increase their control 
over the international credit market by increasing their market 
share through mergers and syndication. Equation 3 indicates
that an increase in the creditors' market share raises the 
potential costs of default for the debtor and hence reduces the 
probability of default for any given amount of annual debt 
repayment proportional to A. In terms of Figure 1, the feasible 
rescheduling curve shifts downward. Furthermore, equation 
A.17 indicates that an increase in the creditor's control over the 
international credit market may also change the slope of the 
creditor's indifference curves since p, p' and 0 are affected by s. 
However, the differentiation of equation A.17 with respect to s 
indicates that the change in the slope of the creditor's 
indifference curves is not clear a-prior i. Similarly to the 
discussion of proposition 4, if the increase in the creditor's 
market share steepens his indifference curves, the tangency 
point between the lower rescheduling curve and a steeper 
indifference curve should reveal a shorter repayment period 
but not necessarily a larger annual repayment. The steeper the 
(new) indifference curve and the larger the downward shift of 
the feasible rescheduling curve (i.e., the larger the A,), the 
smaller the likelihood of a larger annual repayment. In 
contrast, if the increase in the creditor's control over the 
international credit market flattens his indifference curves, the 
(new) tangency point should reveal a larger annual repayment 
but not necessarily a shorter repayment period. The flatter the 
(new) indifference curve and the smaller the downward shift 
of the feasible rescheduling curve (i.e., the smaller the A,), the 
smaller the likelihood of a shorter repayment period.
V. Debtor's Choice of a Feasible Rescheduling Scheme
In analogy to the creditor's problem, the debtor's objective is 
postulated as maximising expected utility from actually 
repaying as little as possible, subject to the expected debt- 
repayment constraint portrayed by the feasible rescheduling 
curve. That is, the larger the amount of actually unpaid debt 
(Do - MX) the higher the debtor's level of satisfaction.
Similarly to the analysis of the creditor's preferences, it is 
assumed that the debtor's preferences can be represented by the 
following negative exponential utility function
ud = l-exp{-Rd(D0-MX)} (17)
where Rd is a positive scalar indicating the debtor's degree of 
absolute risk aversion. In which case,
E(ud) = l-exp(-RdDb)E[exp(RdMX)]. (18)
Since X is a random variable having a binomial distribution 
b(T,l-p), E[exp(R^MX)] is the moment-generating function of 
the binomial distribution evaluated at R^M  and consequently 
the debtor's expected utility function can be expressed as:
EIudOo-MX)] = l-exp(-Rd Do)[p + (l-p)exp(RdM)]T. (19)
PROPOSITION 6: The debtor's in difference curves are  
downward sloping in the M-T plane.
The proof of this proposition is given in the Appendix.
Furthermore, the differentiation of equation 19 with respect 
to T implies
dE[ud(D0-MX)] _
^ “-------- = - y Tlog\|/<0 (20)
for every M>0 since
V =  p(M) + (l-p(M)) exp(RdM) >  1. (21)
Thus, the debtor's indifference curves which are closer to the 
origin represent higher levels of expected utility. That is, the 
debtor prefers feasible rescheduling schemes characterised by 
an annual repayment smaller than M* and a repayment period 
shorter than T* as well as feasible rescheduling schemes
characterised by an annual repayment larger than M and a
repayment period shorter than T to the creditor's choice A = 
(M *, T *)  as depicted by sections A A ' and BB' of the feasible 
rescheduling curve in Figure 3 below. In the context of Figure 
3, the debtor's most preferred rescheduling scheme is A ', which 
is associated with the minimum annual debt repayment. More 
generally, the solution to the debtor's expected utility 
maximisation problem (by repaying as little as possible) is a 
com er one —  either the feasible scheme associated with the 
m inim um  am ount of annual repayment or the feasible 
scheme associated with the maximum annual repayment. In 
the latter case, the high probability of admissible default 
compensates for the large renegotiated annual repayment.
Figure 3. The Debtor's Choice of a Rescheduling Scheme
VI. Pareto Efficient Rescheduling Schemes
The Pareto efficient rescheduling schemes constitute a set of all 
those feasible schemes which are superior to the rest in the 
sense that either the creditor or debtor is better off while the 
other is not worse off. The particular combination of the 
creditor's and debtor's preferences displayed in Figure 4 implies 
that the set of the Pareto efficient rescheduling schemes might 
be entirely located on the upward sloping section A 'A of the 
feasible rescheduling curve which is bounded from above by 
the creditor's most preferred scheme A and from below by the
debtor's most preferred scheme A'. The underlying rationale is 
that by having a choice from section AB the debtor is worse off 
while the creditor is not better off. Moreover, by having a 
choice from section A'A the creditor is better off than by 
having a choice from section BB' while the debtor is not worse 
off and even better off in section A'C.
Figure 4. The Pareto Efficient Set of Rescheduling Schemes 
under Symmetric Information
Section A'A defines the Pareto efficient set of rescheduling 
schemes from which the rescheduling scheme is likely to be 
obtained w ithin a bargaining process characterised by 
symmetric information. Obviously, the greater the creditor's 
(debtor's) relative bargaining power, the closer the negotiated 
rescheduling scheme to point A (A'). However, if information
is asymmetric, it is likely that the feasible rescheduling curve 
considered by the debtor lies below the feasible rescheduling 
curve considered by the creditor, as is argued in section II. In 
which case, the Pareto efficient rescheduling schemes are 
located in the shaded area A'DAF as indicated in Figure 5. 
Since the creditor prefers A to E, while the debtor remains 
indifferent, E and, by a similar argument, the combinations of 
M and T in its close vicinity, are not Pareto efficient 
rescheduling schemes.
Figure 5. The Pareto Efficient Set of Rescheduling Schemes 
under Asymmetric Information
VIL Conclusion
Assuming that a country's inclination to default increases 
with its external debt burden, but decreases with the potential 
loss of access to the international credit m arket, and 
recognising that a short-term illiquidity does not necessarily 
lead to a long-term insolvency, this paper analysed the set of 
feasible rescheduling schemes and described the creditor's and 
debtor's choices of rescheduling schemes from the feasible set 
within a framework in which they are both risk averse and 
maximise expected utility.
It was shown that the feasible rescheduling set can be 
depicted by an inverted U-shaped curve in the plane spanned 
by the annual repayment and the repayment period. It was also 
shown that if the probability of default is sufficiently sensitive 
to changes in the annual debt repayment, the creditor's most 
preferred scheme might be on the upward sloping section of 
the feasible rescheduling curve. This finding indicates that the 
creditor may prefer to bear a lower risk of default and hence 
may require the least amount of annual repayment between 
the two feasible ones associated with his preferred choice of a 
repayment period. The analysis also indicated the effects of the 
international interest rate, the country's external debt and 
potential output and the creditor's market share on the 
creditor's choice of a rescheduling scheme.
The analysis of the debtor's preferences indicated that if the 
debtor has an aversion toward risk, his indifference curves are 
downward sloping in the plane spanned by the annual 
repayment and the repayment period. In which case, the 
debtor's problem has a com er solution. The debtor prefers 
feasible rescheduling schemes characterised by a shorter 
repayment period, but not necessarily by a smaller annual
repayment due to an increase in the probability of an 
admissible default as the annual repayment rises.
Finally, the paper demonstrated that the set of the Pareto 
efficient rescheduling schemes might be located on the upward 
sloping side of the feasible rescheduling curve below (and 
including) the creditor's choice and hence reflects that in the 
case of a sovereign debt there can be a positive relationship 
between the length of the repayment period and the amount of 
the annual repayment rather than the conventional trade-off 
which is a characteristic of a private debt-repayment.
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APPENDIX
Proof o f Proposition 1: Recall that
(l-p)Do
lo g .
T =
P-
[l-ocM/(Y-5M)+Xs]M
logp (A.l)
The slope of the feasible rescheduling curve is found by 
differentiating equation A.l w.r.t. M:
dT
dM
'(1 -b)D0 ' {  8[(l+Xs)S+a]M2 - 2[(l+Xs)8+a]YM+(l+Xs)Y2}
0
(logP) {[1-aM/(7-8M)+Xs]M}2 (Y-8M)2
A V V
0 0 0
(A.2)
Note that as long as r>0, p el and hence log|3<0. Recalling that 
T>0, it is required, therefore, that the numerator of the first 
term on the r.h.s. of equation A.l would be negative:
lo g .
(l-p)DQ 
[1-<xM /(Y -8M )+X s ]M.
< 0 . (A.3)
Consequently, the denominator of equation A.2 is positive, 
and recalling that P<1, we obtain that
< *T > rt „ _ w ,  2Y W (l+Xs)Y2 
dM ̂  0 as V ^  M2 -T  M + = 0.
Note that
dV ZY v
dM =  2 M ’ T  (A4)
and that
d2V
S nP
That is, V is a convex function of M. Moreover, equation 2 
indicates that the feasible range of annual debt repayment is 0 <
M <  Y/ 8. In this range
dV 2Y
dM = 2 M - 8 " < 0 <A 6 >
Y
for every M < ^  (including M max) as depicted in Figure A l.
Figure A.1
The roots of V are
Mi ,2 =Y/8±<t>
where
M
(A.7)
y  I g + A i r ~  
V ^ K l+ X sJ& fa ]- (A.8)
Since it is assumed that 8>1 and X and a  are positive, then <J> > 0 
and Y/ 8 + <|> is not in the feasible range. Thus,
V S
> 0 for 0 < M < Y/ 8 - 
= 0 f or M=  V /8 - <|> (A'9)
<  0 for Y/ 8 -  <J> <M<Y/ 8
and consequently,
>  0 for M mjn <  M <  Y /8 - <t> 
dT J
dM I = 0 for M = Y/ 8 - <|) (A10)
<  0 for Y /8  - <(> <M £M max- ®
M athem atical presentation  o f  the creditor's cho ice : By 
substituting the constraint 10 into equation 15 for T and then 
differentiating with respect to M, the necessary condition for 
maximum expected utility for the creditor from the perceived 
sum of actual debt-repayments is:
dEtdM X)1 = -e(M*)T(M*)(T(MV (M*)/e(MV  •T(M*)1oge(M>)1 = 0 (A.11) 
where
0(M*) = p(M*) + [l-p(M*)]exp(-RcM*) (A.12)
T(M*) = {log{p-(l-p)D0/[l-aMV(Y-8M*)+Xs]M*)/logP} -1 (A.13) 
p(M*) = aM*/(Y-8M*) - Xs (A.l 4)
and 0 '(M *) and T'(M *) are the derivatives of 0 (M *) and T(M*), 
respectively, with respect to M evaluated at the optimal level 
M *. Given that the second-order condition for maximum is 
satisfied, the necessary condition A .ll yields the creditor's 
optimal level of renegotiated annual debt-repayment as a 
function of the model's parameters:
M* = f(Do,Y, r, a , 8, X, s, R c) (A.15)
and the substitution of f(Do, Y, r, a ,  8, X, s, Rc) into equation 
A.13 for M* gives the optimal repayment period of the 
rescheduled debt:
T* = g(Do, Y, r, a, 8, X, s, R c). (A.l 6)
Proof o f Proposition 2: The total differential of equation 15 
implies that the slope of such an indifference curve is given by:
dT T{exp(-RcM)[p'+Rc (l-p)] -pQ
dM | E(uc)=const. ~ 01og0
where
0 = p(M) + [l-p(M)]exp(-Rc M). (A.18)
Equation A.18 implies that for a risk averse creditor O<0<1 and 
hence the denominator in the above expression is negative. 
Consequently,
dT
dM (A.19)I E(uc)=const. < < r c  I  p J
Proof o f Proposition 6: By totally differentiating equation 19, 
we obtain that the slope of the debtor's indifference curve in 
the M-T plane is
dT -T(exp(RdM)[Rd(l-p)-p'1+p'}
dM | E(ud) = const. ylogvy
where
V a  p(M) + (l-p(M)) exp(RdM). (A.21)
Since y > l  for every M>0, y logy  is always positive and
dM I E(ud) = const. > 0 (A-22)
as ex p(RdM)lRd(l-p)-p']+p' |  0 or, equivalently, as 
M l ^ ta
This implies
dT
dM I E(ud) = const. <  0 (A,23)
for all M>0 if
In
_Rd(l-p)-p'_
£ 0  (A.24)
or, equivalently, if
Rd(l-p)-p'
which, in turn, requires that
Rd(l-p)S>0. (A.26)
Since it is assumed that R d>0 and 0<p < l, the above condition 
is satisfied. I
r, i!v
.
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